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I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The campaign finance reform session agenda considers the following:
(1) the problems posed by the current system of campaign finance, (2)
alternative approaches and related legal constraints, and (3) advisable
strategies to implement preferred reforms.

* March 23, 2001. Moderator: Scott Harshbarger, President and CEO, Common
Cause. Panelists: Frank Clemente, Director, Public Citizen Congress Watch; Charles
Lewis, Executive Director, Center for Public Integrity; Nick Nyhart, Executive Director,
Public Campaign; E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Executive Director, Brennan Center for Justice,
New York University School of Law.
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II. PROBLEMS
A. Campaign Finance and Excessive Influence by Contributors
The problem of campaign finance influence is pervasive at all levels
of government. Campaign costs are increasing well above inflation
rates. Spending limits rarely apply. Recent state level term limitation
measures only exacerbate the importance of money in affected states, as
new offices with new constituencies must be won at shorter intervals.
Money dictates who runs and often who wins. Great candidates opt out
because they cannot possibly raise the amount of money they need to
compete or because the very idea of raising the necessary sums offends
them. Money buys access and access buys influence. Lobbyists who
represent moneyed interests are generally able to block measures against
the short-term financial interests of their respective clients. The drive to
raise funds distracts officeholders from their official duties.
The written materials presented prior to the conference included
several examples of the undue influence of contributions in congressional
campaigns as documented by Public Citizen and Common Cause, among
other organizations.1 They also include commentary by Charles Lewis
of the Center for Public Integrity, outlining current campaign
contribution influence problems in congressional, presidential, and state
settings.2 This is followed by a recent Common Cause report,3 the table
of contents to Common Cause’s recent book on money in politics,4 and
Lastly, Public
opinion pieces on campaign finance problems.5
1. See, e.g., COMMON CAUSE, PARTY SOFT MONEY (1998); PUBLIC CITIZEN,
KILLING US SOFTLY: SOFT MONEY’S PHENOMENAL GROWTH AND ITS HARM TO THE
PUBLIC (2001) [hereinafter KILLING US SOFTLY], available at http://www.citizen.org/doc
uments/killingussoftlyreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003); Press Release, Common
Cause, Statement of Common Cause President Scott Harshbarger at Paying the Price
News Conference (June 15, 2000), http://www.commoncause.org/publications/june00/06
1500.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
2. Charles Lewis, Everything I’m Telling You Is Entirely Legal, Remarks at the
22nd Annual Conference of the Council on Governmental Ethics Laws (December 5,
2000), http://www.public-i.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportID=141&L1=10&L2=70&L3=
15&L4=0&L5=0&State=&Year=2000 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
3. Press Release, Common Cause, 89 Percent of House Incumbents in Financially
Uncompetitive Races; House Candidates Enjoy Record $526 Million in Campaign Funds
Through September 30, According to Common Cause (Nov. 2, 2000) (on file with
author).
4. COMMON CAUSE, A REPORTER’S GUIDE TO MONEY IN POLITICS: CAMPAIGN
2000 (2000).
5. PUBLIC CITIZEN, DISCLOSURE LAW PASSED IN 2000 CLOSES CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LOOPHOLE (n.d.), available at http://www.citizen.org/congress/campaign/legislation/
section527/articles.cfm?ID=5315 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003); Scott Harshbarger, Where
Has Democracy Gone? The View from the Shadow Conventions, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2000, at A15.
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Campaign’s Campaigns and Television outlines how increasing
campaign and media costs exacerbate the problem.6
B. Lack of Disclosure
Although disclosure requirements have seemingly proliferated, they
may neither be adequate nor enforced. In particular, by avoiding certain
words explicitly referring to an election, political players of all sorts can
influence elections without revealing their identities. What about
contributions received just after the final pre-election report? What
about contributions made through independent committees? Is relevant
information provided? What does disclosure accomplish?
C. Accuracy and Fairness
Campaigns have become misleading sound bite contests—button
pushing, focus group screened ads have little substance. Last minute
misleading mailers proliferate. How does this problem tie into campaign
finance disparities?7
D. Access and Equality
Is it possible to run a visible campaign without private wealth or
wealthy friends? To what extent is the one person, one vote ideal
distorted by the financial demand of campaigns?
III. ENACTMENT OF THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD BILL
A. Status
What are the current provisions and status of the McCain-Feingold bill?8
6. PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, CAMPAIGNS AND TELEVISION; DOLLARS VS. DISCOURSE
(1999) (on file with author).
7. See CHARLES LEWIS, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF THE
PRESIDENT 2000, at 9–14, 340–42 (2000).
8. See, e.g., COMMON CAUSE, THE HAGEL BILL: A FATALLY FLAWED PROPOSAL
(n.d) (on file with author); PUBLIC CITIZEN, KEY PROVISIONS OF THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD
BILL (2001) (on file with author); PUBLIC CITIZEN, MCCAIN-FEINGOLD IMPACTS AND
WHAT IT LEAVES UNDONE (2001) (on file with author); PUBLIC CITIZEN, REINFORCING
THE RICH: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROPOSALS TO RAISE THE $1,000 LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL
CONTRIBUTIONS TO FEDERAL CANDIDATES (2001), available at http://www.citizen.org
/documents/hard$report.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003); U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH
GROUP, THE CONSEQUENCES OF RAISING FEDERAL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS (2001),
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B. Problems Following the McCain-Feingold Bill
Assuming enactment of the McCain-Feingold bill, what problems will
remain?
(1) There will be remaining loopholes regarding soft money.9
Some proposed amendments to the McCain-Feingold bill
would allow soft money with alleged limits. What are the
problems here? Which states retain the soft money loophole?
(2) The hard money problem: designated contributions continue
to buy influence. To what extent is influence enhanced for
organized associations able to arrange enormous hard money
financing even with contribution limits?
(3) “Issue ads”: Will the proposed amendments to the McCainFeingold bill resurrect the problem? What about the states?10
(4) Self-financing.
(5) Nondisclosure.
(6) Media and campaign costs.
Campaign contribution limits can theoretically disperse dependence
and perceived officeholder obligation onto broader populations.
However, two problems emerge: (1) if limits are too low, the cost of
raising sums can approach revenues obtained, which then makes
fundraising and electoral entry difficult and favors special interests able
to coordinate maximum contributions; and (2) contribution limits also
favor wealthy candidates who are able to finance campaigns from their
own private sources.
IV. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
The three most important U.S. Supreme Court decisions on campaign
finance constitutionality are Buckley v. Valeo,11 Austin v. Michigan
available at http://pirg.org/democracy/democracy.asp?id2=5908&id3=CFR& (last visited
Feb. 1, 2003); Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen, Testimony Regarding
“Compelled Speech” and Campaign Finance Reform Before the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration (Apr. 12, 2000), available at http://www.citizen.org/congress/
campaign/issues/paycheck/articles.cfm?ID=5298 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
9. For a discussion of soft money abuse, see, for example, E. Joshua Rosenkranz,
Brennan Center for Justice, Electoral Fraud, Pure and Simple, WASH. POST, Nov. 3,
2000, at A33, available at 2000 WL 25425923.
10. See, e.g., E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The Devil’s in the Details: The Lazio-Clinton
Deal Gags Independent Voices: The Important Difference Between Soft Money and Hard
Money, BRENNAN CENTER PRESS CENTER, Oct. 3, 2000, at OP-ED, at http://www.brennan
center.org/presscenter/oped_2000_101300.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
11. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (considering the constitutionality of the Federal Elections
Campaign Act).
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Chamber of Commerce,12 and Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC.13 Constitutional campaign contribution limits have been enacted
for federal and many state and local races. However, the courts limit
restrictions on contributing to one’s own campaign, and other loopholes
abound, including soft money transfers and independent expenditures.14
Complicating the problem is the constitutional status of issue ads. To
what extent can they be regulated consonant with the First Amendment?
Can disclosure be required where an ad is an attempt to influence an
election, however cloaked? What is the line between “issue advocacy,”
independent from a candidate’s campaign, and “campaign influence
advocacy”?15
Meanwhile, broad based raising of funds may be impeded by
constitutional limitations on forced speech.
Hence, “paycheck
protection” measures, or constitutionally-based decisions, may impede
unions from participating in political campaigns or from lobbying where
political contributions come from union dues. What are the implications
of an “opt-out” opportunity not to contribute funds used by a union for
campaign or lobbying versus a required “opt-in” or necessary affirmation
designation of those contributions? Compare the corporate context:
corporate spending suffers no such circumscription, vis-à-vis the
stockholders whose assets may be similarly devoted.16 The corporation
lobbies and gives to candidates, in states where corporate campaign
contributions are allowed, without a required opt in, and even without a
permitted opt out. What are the implications of this difference?
12. 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (examining a Michigan statute that prohibited corporations
from using corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures in support of or in
opposition to candidates in elections for state office).
13. 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (considering provisions of Missouri’s campaign finance
law limiting amounts of contributions to candidates).
14. E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE:
LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 9–10, 15–21
(1998); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution: What’s
Hot in the Courts, EXTENSIONS, Spring 1999, available at http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/
cachome.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003); Memorandum from Common Cause, to the
National Governing Board, Supreme Court Decision in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC (Feb. 2000) (on file with author).
15. PUBLIC CITIZEN, REGULATION OF PHONY “ISSUE ADS” IS CONSTITUTIONAL
(2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/congress/campaign/issues/constitution/
articles.cfm?ID=5360 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
16. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Legal Pitfalls of Paycheck Protection, BRENNAN
CENTER, PRESS CENTER, May 27, 1998, at http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/op
ed_ 1998_0527.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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V. OPTIMUM MODELS
Is it possible to fashion an optimum model within constitutional
guidelines?
One model advocates complete public funding of
campaigns, providing a quid pro quo for constitutional spending limits,
allowing opt out and allowing candidates to compete without privateinterest dependency.17 However, that option requires some criteria to
determine eligibility for funding. Will eligibility be based on prior votes
received by a party? Will it be based on a petition concept or maybe a
limited number of small contributors to demonstrate threshold support?
Can the petition option simply transfer spending into the costs of petition
gathering outside of a campaign definition? Will low thresholds allow
fringe candidates without real support to receive disproportionate public
funds, creating waste, distraction, and demagoguery?
Another option is a public-to-private contribution match. For
example, California’s proposition 68 in 1988 covered statewide and
local legislative races and included: (1) campaign contribution limits of
$1000 (somewhat higher for statewide office), (2) spending limits set at
close-to-median historical spending for the office, (3) a five-to-one
public funding match for all funds raised from contributors giving $250
or less and residing in the represented district, and (4) financing of the
system from a voluntary check off from state income tax forms.18 One
would raise the $350,000 to $500,000 spending limit for state assembly
races by attracting $250 from 280 to 400 persons.19 New York City has
a four-to-one public match with similar elements, and the city of Los
Angeles has a more modest ordinance in effect.
Another option could be refundable tax credits for contributions.
Although more limited, it could disperse support to a wider group, lessen
dependency on a few, and perhaps constitute the quid pro quo for
spending limits. One example is the Arkansas statute providing for tax
refunds for contributions of up to fifty dollars.20
One commonly suggested reform is free or subsidized television time,
17. Public Campaign, Clean Money Campaign Reform, at http://www.publicampaign.
org/cleanmoney2.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003); Public Campaign, Frequently Asked
Questions About Clean Money Campaign Reform, at http://www.publicampaign.org/QA.
html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
18. Walter Zelman & Ross Johnson, 1988: The Year of Decision for Campaign
Finance Reform and California Democracy, 8 CAL. REG. L. REP. 1 (1988).
19. Proposition 68 passed in 1988, despite substantial advertising against public
financing (ads featured candidates wearing KKK robes). However, proposition 73, a
competing initiative sold as offering more reform but without public financing, obtained
more votes, canceling proposition 68. Proposition 73 was then substantially invalidated
by the federal courts, leaving California with no campaign contribution limits for the
following twelve years.
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-222 (Michie 2000).
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which would substantially reduce the cost of most campaigns. If
implemented, could this proposal impose some information enhancing
features, such as a requirement that no spot be under forty-five seconds
in length?21
A creative alternative is the “patriot dollar” concept of Yale Law
School professor Ackerman, which would allocate $50 to each American
adult that the voter could then designate to their chosen candidates.22
A final approach, perhaps as a supplement where officeholders have
more specific duties, as with local officials or state agency
decisionmakers, is the Oaks Initiative model.23 This mechanism works
on a rule of contract theory. For example, a city council member who
votes to give a public benefit above a threshold value to a private
beneficiary (such as an exclusive trash or cable contract, a tax waiver, or
a zoning variance) may not receive any favor from that interest for five
years thereafter or until two years after the official leaves office,
whichever is longer. The favor prohibition would include gifts,
employment, and campaign contributions for public office.
Whatever the approach taken, the enforcement of legal standards can
be critical. During recent presidential elections, both parties violated the
law by evasively obtaining soft money contributions to the political
parties over maximum allowable limits—to evade contributor
identification. Should we be bringing petitions for writ of mandate to
compel enforcement? What self-enforcing provisions should be in our
model? How do we treat independent expenditures and issue ads? What
about third-party candidates disadvantaged by not qualifying for public
funding or television and debate exposure?
VI. THE HOW: TACTICAL QUESTIONS
We are confronted with one of the most difficult challenges of any
reform effort—convincing those in power to change the method of
election that gave them their offices. How do we succeed?
One approach to ameliorate opposition from general fund spending is
21. See also E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Free TV Speech for Candidates, THE NATION,
June 8, 1998, at 33.
22. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).
23. For a copy of an Oaks initiative, see The Foundation for Taxpayer &
Consumer Rights, Oaks Proposal, http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/citizen/rp/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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to designate a special, nongeneral fund to finance public financing.
However, we are left with determining the possible sources. Another
approach is to designate a preset portion of the general fund. The
advantage of a designated percentage could be psychological. In fact,
less than one-half of one percent of general fund monies in most states
would be sufficient, which would allow the pitch: “Let’s spend slightly
less than one-half of one percent to make sure the rest is spent on the
merits. Let’s make our state ninety-nine and forty-four one hundredths
pure!”
We also need to consider how to continue to interest the media and
which leverage points are available here.24
Some states have initiative options. What needs to be determined is
whether the alternatives are feasible, how much money needs to be
raised, the identity of the likely opponents, and the opponents’ prospects
for success.
* * * * *
VII. BACKGROUND ON PANELISTS
Scott Harshbarger was elected by the National Governing Board of
Common Cause to the post of president and chief executive officer in the
summer of 1999. Common Cause, founded by John Gardner, has been
recognized as one of America’s most effective grassroots citizens’
lobbies for over thirty years.
Prior to joining Common Cause, Harshbarger served two terms as
Massachusetts Attorney General (from 1991 to 1999) after eight years as
District Attorney of Middlesex County, where he won national recognition
for his work in crime prevention, civil rights enforcement, elder protection,
and prosecution of white-collar crime and public corruption.
Elected president of the National Association of Attorneys General in
1996, Harshbarger was one of the nation’s first to sue the tobacco
industry to help recover smoking-related health care costs and to
successfully regulate handguns. He was the Democratic nominee for
governor of Massachusetts in 1998 and is a visiting professor at Harvard
Law School, teaching a course entitled “Government Lawyer: Role of
Ethics and Public Policy.”
Frank Clemente has served as director of Public Citizen’s Congress
Watch since November 1996. For the two years prior, Clemente was a
political consultant, playing a leading role in high profile efforts to defeat
24. See Memorandum from Common Cause, to the National Governing Board,
Partnership with Alliance for Better Campaigns (Feb. 2000) (on file with author).
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two “Contract with America” proposals that would have eliminated
consumer protections against defective products and securities swindlers.
President Clinton vetoed both bills, the Product Liability Reform Act25
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.26
As senior policy advisor to the House Committee on Government
Operations (renamed the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
in 1995) under the chairmanship of Representative John Conyers, Jr., he
oversaw legislation on national health care reform, the environment and
regulatory policy, budget process reforms, and reinventing government.
He has been involved in numerous election campaigns and served as
issues director for Jesse Jackson’s 1988 presidential campaign and
campaign manager for Representative Conyers’s 1994 re-election.
Clemente also founded the national “Jobs with Peace Campaign,” which
lobbied Congress to transfer funds from military to domestic programs
and placed scores of referenda on local ballots through which voters
demanded a shift in spending priorities. Clemente has appeared in
numerous media outlets, including the major network news shows, CNN
and MSNBC talk shows, NPR, the New York Times, the Washington
Post, the Wall Street Journal, and many other print publications.
Charles Lewis is the founder and executive director of the Center for
Public Integrity, a nonprofit and nonpartisan research organization in
Washington, D.C. that concentrates on ethics and public service issues.
The Center is unique in that it does not advocate legislation, but rather
focuses on public service journalism—investigative reporting about
campaign finance and other public interest issues.
Since the Center began operation in May 1990, Lewis has written or
cowritten several of its more than 100 investigative reports. In 1998, he
was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship by the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation. He is the principal author of the Center’s books:
The Buying of the President 2000,27 The Buying of the Congress,28 and
The Buying of the President.29
25. Product Liability Reform Act, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996) (vetoed May 2, 1996).
26. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (1995)
(vetoed Dec. 19, 1995).
27. CHARLES LEWIS, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF THE
PRESIDENT 2000 (2000).
28. CHARLES LEWIS, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF THE
CONGRESS (1998).
29. CHARLES LEWIS, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF THE
PRESIDENT (1996).
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In 1997 Lewis and the Center launched a new project, the
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), an
unprecedented network of the world’s premiere investigative reporters.
ICIJ extends the Center’s style of enterprise journalism globally by
focusing on issues that transcend nation-state borders.
For eleven years, Lewis did investigative reporting at ABC and CBS
News, most recently as a producer for 60 Minutes. His stories twice
received Emmy nominations in the outstanding investigative reporting
category by the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences.
Nick Nyhart is a cofounder and the current executive director of Public
Campaign, a four-year-old national organization dedicated to winning
comprehensive clean money campaign finance reform. As Public
Campaign’s field director from 1997 to 1998, Nyhart worked
extensively with reformers in Arizona and Massachusetts to win full
public financing ballot initiatives in 1998.
For the previous five years, Nyhart directed a six-state project
organizing campaign finance for Northeast Action. The project’s work
with money and politics activists across the Northeast has put the region
in the national spotlight with its cutting edge reform measures. A former
community organizer, Nyhart is a twenty-year veteran of grassroots
issues and electoral coalition politics. He has offices in Hartford,
Connecticut and Washington, D.C.
E. Joshua Rosenkranz, a founder of the Brennan Center for Justice,
litigates and publishes extensively on campaign finance and election
law. The Brennan Center unites thinkers and advocates in pursuit of a
vision of inclusive and effective democracy. It is dedicated to
developing and implementing an innovative, nonpartisan agenda of
scholarship, public education, and legal action that promotes equality
and human dignity, while safeguarding fundamental freedoms. The
Brennan Center’s campaign finance work has included cases from
California to Maine, including the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case,
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC.30
Rosenkranz clerked for Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
from 1987 to 1988, as well as then-Judge Antonin Scalia and Judge Stephen
F. Williams of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit from 1986 to 1987. Following his clerkships, Rosenkranz founded,
and for eight years ran (from 1988 to 1996), New York City’s acclaimed
Office of the Appellate Defender. In that capacity, he personally argued
over 100 appeals and was the attorney of record in more than 1500 other
appeals. In 1996, The American Lawyer named Rosenkranz one of the
nation’s forty-five leading public sector lawyers under the age of forty-five.
30.
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VIII. PANEL DISCUSSION31
ROBERT FELLMETH:
This Session covers campaign finance. We know it has grown as a
source of corruptive influence across all three branches of government.
We know about soft money and that the McCain-Feingold Bill is now
being considered in the Congress; so, our session today is most timely.
We also know that at the state level there are also serious problems.
How do we reconcile the need for elected official integrity with the
First Amendment right of candidates, contributors, and independent
committees? What is the optimum model? What are achievable models?
What are the prospects? How do we get there?
Luckily for us, we are privileged to have five of the nation’s leading
experts on campaign finance here on our stage to share their thoughts
and insights with all of us. In addition to the panelists whose resumes
are summarized above, we are also joined by Dave Vladeck, who will be
taking questions from the audience and prioritizing them so that during
our question and answer period Scott can review them and pose them to
the panelists as appropriate.
For those of you who do not know Dave, he is the director of the
Public Citizen litigation group. He has been with the litigation group for over
twenty years, first as staff and, since 1992, as its director. He has handled a
broad range of litigation, including First Amendment, health and safety,
civil rights, and open government cases. He has litigated a number of cases
before the United States Supreme Court, over forty cases before the
court of appeals, and has testified before Congress on First Amendment
issues. He teaches at Georgetown University Law Center, often as an adjunct,
and I think he was a full-time visiting professor in 1999–2000, as I
recall. He is a professor and academic, a scholar and litigator, and we
are very lucky to have him here.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Thank you very much, Bob. I am somewhat new to campaign finance
reform, on a national level. I served as an elected official in
Massachusetts, where we always had some form of reform in gestation.
The state has a progressive, liberal legislature and the Clean Elections
31. This Part has been edited to remove the minor cadences of speech that appear
awkward in writing and to identify significant sources when first referred to by the speakers.
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Law passed by the people in 1998.32 Many of my progressive, liberal
democratic friends are now doing everything they can to avoid enacting
and implementing those reforms, more out of concern for contested
elections and challenges and less over the question of the large money
influence that we face at the national level.
As the Senate engages in a discussion of the McCain-Feingold bill, the
discussion sometimes rises to Jeffersonian levels, but more often leaves
us wondering whether our representatives are protecting their own
offices and their own campaign and funding advantage, rather than
advancing the public interest. The question we need to pose is: What
about this issue makes natural allies sworn enemies? Why is it that
groups that have worked together in coalition on a whole range of social,
economic, and justice issues find themselves at loggerheads in
discussing how we finance our campaigns? How is it that we have these
incredible gaps? Is it a question of constitutional right? Is it social
inequity? What’s going on here? Why is this so hard to understand? Or
is this really about incumbency and asking people to change the laws
which serve to their advantage? Is it that the majority of legislators are
lawyers? Is it no accident that the only self-regulating profession in
Massachusetts, and many states, is the legal profession? So is this really
unusual? Can we expect a group used to self-regulation to make
changes to their common detriment in order to serve a larger good?
How do we persuade such people to alter the rules of the game when
they are its current product?
In other words, is campaign finance reform a symptom of a larger
issue about our democracy, which I think many of us believe? Or, is it
just another interest struggle—trying to decide public policy on the
merits, as opposed to special interest determination? Thirty years ago,
John Gardner founded Common Cause, believing that the only group not
organized in Washington, D.C was the people. His goal was to mobilize
people to re-engage in their democracy to create a new source of power.
Now we know how to identify a problem. We know enough not to
give it to a lawyer; we give it to somebody who is not “J.D. impaired,”
because the challenge here is to lay out what the issue is or might be.
Chuck Lewis, as you know from much of his work on money and
politics and corruption, is a national expert. Many related issues have
been framed by his Center for Public Integrity over the years. We are
going to start here with Chuck, laying out the problem from his
perspective.

32. The Massachusetts Clean Election Law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55A,
§ 1–18 (West Supp. 2002).
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CHARLES LEWIS:
Thanks, Scott. It is difficult to sum up a huge subject like this—
including half a million words we have written in ten years—in ten
minutes or less. But my job is to set forth the problem. One of my
favorite quotes is from James Madison: “If men were angels, no
government would be necessary.”33 We know that men and women are
not angels, and politicians are certainly not angels, and the political
campaign industry may be the least regulated industry in the U.S. today.
We have not had a law at the federal level for more than twenty years;
its practitioners do not want to be regulated. No one likes regulating
himself or herself.
I think all the discussion really has to do with how you address that
inherent self-interest conflict problem. It is the nub of everything; folks
do not want to be regulated, and there are special interests aligned with
them who do not want to be regulated, and that is why no one has moved
successfully to regulate them for twenty-five years at the federal level.
But we have been particularly deep in the muck here in recent years. It
is grim, looking at the recent last-minute presidential pardon of an
international fugitive after more than a million dollars passed from his
kind offices. In recent years, we have the drug traffic dealers and arms
dealers who met with the President because they gave money, and the
Air Force One special trips and overnight stays in the Lincoln bedroom.
There are the 1500 who gave $26 million in 103 coffees in the White
House (which Mr. Clinton referred to as “nonfundraising events”), we
have Al Gore attending the Buddhist monastery fundraiser and referring
to it as “community outreach,” and then Tom Daschle going up to the
top of George Washington’s head at Mount Rushmore—taking donors to
an area that is actually illegal and off-limits. We have Bob Dole taking
folks on midnight tours of the capitol and George W. Bush having sixty
donors or more sleeping overnight in the Governor’s mansion in Texas.
Bush is the first President to raise $100 million from private sources and
the first major presidential candidate not to abide by the post-Watergate
laws. Even though it was the first time we have seen that in U.S.
history, it was a one-day story. He raised $37 million in his first four
months—more than $300,000 a day. You do not raise money like that
from backyard bake sales and barbecues. Fourteen of Bush’s top
twenty-five career patrons are from the gas industry; his top patron is
33.
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Enron, which has given him and his party at least $2 million, probably
more. And yes, as California knows to its detriment, he has made
decisions in Texas and Washington state that are friendly to Enron.
Recently, we have seen decisions from carbon-dioxide emissions
standards for the mining industry, help for the credit card industry, and a
bankruptcy bill where the industry got what it wanted and gave eighty
percent of its money to one party and a particular President to get that
result. In some polls, as many as ninety-five percent of the American
people believe that the policy was bought and sold. So we have the
perception of a pay-to-play process.
A few years ago, I was in the unenviable situation of putting out a
book about Congress on the same day as the Ken Starr report on Monica
Lewinsky surfaced; I hate when that happens. But we had thirty-six
researchers, writers, and editors who worked for a year and a half, who
looked at things the average American cares about, and then examined
what their employees serving in Congress did about those issues. I will
just mention two or three. There is this conceit enunciated by politicians
that money just buys access, not influence, and that such access buying
does not affect our lives—it is irrelevant and immaterial. Of course,
that’s a crock.
We looked at food safety. Nine thousand people die a year from bad
food and millions more get sick. What did Congress do on food safety
in ten years? Nothing. Not a single bill went to the floor of the House
or Senate. Members of Congress received $41 million from the meat
packers and other food interests.
We were told that cable deregulation, the Telecom Act of 1996,34 would
bring cable rates down; yet, they went up fifteen to twenty percent, and, yes,
Congress got $15 to $20 million dollars from that unfettered monopoly.
Tobacco—cigarettes in particular—causes cancer and other diseases.
More than 400,000 people die every year just in this country, and we
still have policies to insure tobacco, to export tobacco, and to protect our
growers from imports; and, yes, the industry gave $30 million in the last
ten years. I could go on and on and on.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
You could go back to Upton Sinclair, go through our history, and that
is one of the comments that we face all the time. Whether you are in
North Carolina or in the U.S. Senate: “We make these decisions on their
merits. We have to have money to get through this. Plus, it’s all fairly
open. It’s all on the front page. This has always gone on. And if you
34. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
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really could show it, why aren’t people being indicted?” Why don’t
bribery and corruption statutes suffice? This is the appearance. But life
is not all about appearances. It may be good for books and stories, but
why is this different? Why should anyone believe them when they tell
us that it really does not affect policy?
CHARLES LEWIS:
Well, one of the problems you have in this whole discussion is
disingenuousness by politicians. No one ever acknowledges the effect
of money on policy, and so journalists and the public are caught in this
cat-and-mouse game of trying to catch them, and it gets beside the point.
The other problem about prosecution is—this is a dangerous thing to say
in a legal setting—politicians and lawyers write the laws so that they
won’t be enforced frequently. The Justice Department is not terribly
inclined to take on the people who give them their funding. Think of the
last time we have seen a bribery or corruption or conflict of interest case
involving a member of Congress. Not a morals issue; I am talking about
a campaign contribution as a source of improper influence. We haven’t,
of course.
There are significant issues. One is that the amount of money is
completely out of control. It went up almost fifty percent just in the last
four years—to $3 billion in 2000 from $2.02 billion dollars in 1996. I
am no economist, but I do not think inflation went up that much.
Outside interest groups spent $150 million in 1996—today nearly $500
million. I think that this was the first election in which party and outside
money exceeded what the candidates spent themselves. The candidates
are becoming bit players in their own dramas; there is something very
strange here when the money is overwhelming even the candidates. Of
course, they are quite complacent.
Who gives money? Ninety-six percent of the American people do not
give a dime to any politician. A check for $1000 or more comes from
one-tenth of one percent. Donors are basically middle-aged white males.
Of course, we are talking about corporations, labor unions, and wealthy
individuals; so, there is a narrow sliver of our society sponsoring our
politicians.
The news media is also becoming rich from this process. In the 2000
election, there was half as much political coverage as in 1996; in 1996
there was half as much as 1992. A candidate cannot be heard today in
terms of free media, because the news media does not cover it;
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meanwhile, the media received about $1 billion from ads. In 1981, it
received $80 million. It has become a major source of revenue. And
they also spent $11 million to kill campaign finance reform.
The money is out of control, and the amounts of money are fairly
astonishing. The time the candidates spend trying to raise it is off the
charts. The accountability for the money is also a problem, obviously.
There are a lot of secret groups; even with the new “527 law,”35 it is
fairly easy to hide money, particularly going into the states. Archibald
Cox, the famous lawyer, says that today we have more secrecy, money,
and corruption in the process than any time in U.S. history, including the
Watergate era.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
The next question is for Josh. What are the legal and constitutional
constraints that are preventing us from dealing with all of this? Is it a
lack of will power? Are we failing to mobilize? Before Josh comments,
does anybody else want to add a quick hit on the problem? Frank?
FRANK CLEMENTE:
I would add one thing—it is not just the campaign money. In fact, if
you add up that money and you compare it to how much is spent on
lobbying, especially by industries and trade associations, campaign
contributions are about ten percent of what they spend on the entire
system, and that is the entire system that we can count. The drug
industry, for instance, gives about $10 to $15 million to federal
candidates and parties every two-year election cycle, but it spends $80 to
$100 million lobbying Congress. That does not even count television
ads. I do not know whether folks saw the “Citizens for Better Medicare”
ads that have run across the country in the last period, but that was
another $50 million on top. After that are all of their “astroturf”
grassroots campaigns. So the campaign money is just part of the system;
it is a much bigger system of special interest influence.

35. Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 527
(2000)).
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NICK NYHART:
We can look at the problem of undue influence on elected officials,
how they vote, what their views are. But there is another aspect: who
decides to run for office anymore? Massachusetts, which enacted public
financing several years ago,36 ranks forty-ninth among the states in the
proportion of seats that have a contested race. Seventy percent of
legislative seats in Massachusetts do not have opposition. When you get
to the ballot on election day, seventy out of each one hundred people
face a ballot where there is only one candidate. So it shapes who runs
for office as well.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
That is right. Senator Feingold is always making the point that twenty
years ago he could actually think about growing up, running for Senate,
being a U.S. Senator. Now he tells college students that if they are not
wealthy and not willing to raise money all the time, they cannot grow up
to be a U.S. Senator.
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
I was actually going to comment on what Nick just said about
electoral competition, and it is precisely the point you just made, Scott.
The only people that run are people who can actually conceive of and
stomach the idea of being on a constant treadmill of fundraising or the
Jon Corzines of the world, who have the unlimited funds to run for
office.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Obviously, there are other issues this group can talk about. But I want
to now switch because one of the realities in this world is the constraint
of constitutional and legal issues. These issues need to be understood.
We have the First Amendment issue, with the American Civil Liberties
Union on the other side of many of these points. Josh, you have done
more work in this area; what are we dealing with here? In the materials
we listed several cases, but talk to us particularly about Buckley v.
Vallejo.37 It did not, in my legal history, stand out with Brown v. Board
36. The Massachusetts Clean Election Law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55A, § 1–18
(West Supp. 2002).
37. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

35

PRINTERCAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM.DOC

1/15/2020 3:34 PM

of Education38 or Miranda.39 (I am dating myself; I apologize.) But why
is this case influencing the way we discuss this topic?
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
I am the one who is most J.D. impaired, which is why I was chosen to
answer that question. Buckley is the tree that sits in the middle of the
ball field. Everyone has to play around it, and when you hit the tree, it is
an automatic out. To understand Buckley, you have to have a sense of its
source. It emerged out of the 1974 post-Watergate reforms, which did
four important things. First, they limited contributions, that is, the
money that goes directly into the pockets of candidates. Second, they
limited spending of three sorts, the spending that a Jon Corzine might
take out of his own pocket and spend in support of his own election or
defeat, the spending that a Hillary Clinton might engage in from the
small contributions given to her campaign, and spending by everyday
people or groups in support of or against a candidate. The third thing
these reforms did was to require disclosure of contributions and of
spending related to elections. And then, finally, in the presidential arena
they provided for public financing of candidates in return for limits on
spending. What Buckley did, when it came down in 1976, was to take a
very fine-tuned congressional scheme and rip it to shreds. It upheld the
contribution limits, it upheld the disclosure, it upheld the spending limits
connected to public financing and public financing itself, but it struck
the other spending limits. It struck the limits on independent spending
of groups or individuals, it struck the limits on a Jon Corzine spending
his own money, and it struck the limits on the spending of campaigns
from money raised from others.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Is there a total barrier to Congress going back and trying to fix it at
this point? Why has that case sat now for all these years as the barrier
when Congress supposedly could have tried to fix it? Or, did it hold that
money is speech? Did it really say that?
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
Well, let me answer the first question first. When the Supreme Court
pronounces that the Constitution prohibits X, Congress cannot go back
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that separate but equal was inherently unequal under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
39. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements obtained
from defendants during police interrogation, without full warning of constitutional rights,
were inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination).
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and do X. It can do almost-X, and try and finagle around the margins,
but the best reading of Buckley is that the Supreme Court said Congress
cannot limit spending, period. I have written a book that takes other tacks,
suggesting that the Supreme Court did not exactly say that; maybe the
Supreme Court said that Congress cannot limit spending in order to
prevent corruption, but perhaps Congress can limit spending for other
reasons.40
But to answer the second question, Scott, Buckley is often characterized
as a case that stands for the proposition that “money equals speech.” I
have always thought of that as a lampoon of what the Supreme Court
actually said. You always hear the Mitch McConnells of the world
lampooning Buckley in that way. What Buckley actually said was
something that is more reasonable. It said that it takes money to speak.
It takes money to buy a ream of paper. Any attempt to control the flow
of money into politics necessarily calls into play the First Amendment.
It does not mean that the First Amendment always trumps regulation or
the reason that the legislature might have for regulating, but it means
that we have got to balance the reasons for the regulation against the
impact on speech.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
So from your view then, when we ask the question: “Is there any
chance the Supreme Court will reconsider the case?” is it your view that
there is a way to deal with some of the issues we have talked about that
is constitutional, that is within Buckley? Is it your view that Buckley is
just often used by people politically? Has it taken on a life of its own
here?
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
Yes to all of those things. First, there is no question that Congress can
engage in some meaningful reform, notwithstanding Buckley. But the
truth is, Buckley has become a major obstacle. I described it as a tree in
the ball field; it has evolved into something that is more like the trees in
the Wizard of Oz, that will catch fly balls that are flying over it—or the
thing that ate Manhattan, a mutant monstrosity. Buckley has come to
stand for all kinds of things that the Buckley Court never intended. It has
40. E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE:
LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (1998).
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been known to chew up reforms and spit them out into little pieces. And
ultimately, my answer to the question that you started with, Scott, is yes;
I think Buckley will be revisited by the Supreme Court. There are six
members of the Court who are already on record for the proposition that
Buckley is fundamentally flawed in one major respect, and that is its
distinction between contributions, on the one hand, and spending, on the
other hand. Four justices say Congress should be allowed to regulate
both, and two say Congress should be allowed to regulate neither. So
Buckley sort of teeters as this rotting tree just waiting for the next strong
wind to blow it over. The only question is whether it falls on top of us
or on top of Mitch McConnell.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Is there a possible equal protection claim? Any chance with the
Supreme Court in light of Bush v. Gore?41 Does that have any
relevance?
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
Great question! We have agonized about whether we can take Bush v.
Gore and shove it somewhere where it belongs. On this particular
issue—
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
We are independent, nonpartisan groups up here, just in case—
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
The answer is that Bush v. Gore could be pushed in all kinds of
directions. I do not see a great legal argument for using Bush v. Gore to
leverage the overruling of Buckley or to change the campaign finance
laws. The Supreme Court quite emphatically in Buckley rejected an
argument that campaign finance limits, like spending limits, are
permitted in order to equalize.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Take us back then, as we go to this issue. We talk to Senator McCain
about the McCain-Feingold bill, and we hear a lot about Senator Mitch
McConnell, who, for those of you who have not been following this, is
one of the leading opponents of reform. McConnell often speaks very
eloquently in constitutional (First Amendment) terms about this issue.
He has taken the position, at least until the recent Shrink case,42 that the
41.
42.
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Supreme Court was going to strike down any kind of regulation,
inevitably permitting unregulated soft money.
Hence, wealthy
individuals, unions, and corporations may give effectively beyond the
legal limit as a speech right, and you certainly cannot deal with issue
ads, and that Buckley just stops all that. Is that true?
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
No. Mitch McConnell is quite eloquent on the First Amendment, but
he is about as wrong as he is eloquent. And, as an aside, this is a guy
who never met a First Amendment violation he didn’t like until
campaign finance reform came along. There is a whole lot that can be
done by way of regulating the flow of money into politics that would not
violate Buckley; I already said that. Scott asked about soft money and
issue advocacy; let’s start with soft money.
The Federal Election Campaign Act,43 the 1974 reform that we already
spoke about, limits contributions that candidates raise for their own
campaigns. Soft money is a complete end run around those limits. Soft
money is truckloads full of money that come from the very corporations and
unions that are absolutely barred from giving to candidates, as well as
from wealthy individuals. The soft money is raised by candidates, funneled
into the political parties, and the output is, lo and behold, political ads
that are about the candidates. They do not advocate the election or
defeat of candidates explicitly; instead, they talk about what a dirt bag
candidate X is and allow you to draw your own conclusion on whether to
vote for him or not. So can soft money be limited constitutionally? The answer
is, and this is close to a no-brainer in constitutional law, yes. Since 1907
it has been permissible to limit political contributions by corporations; since the
1940s unions have been prohibited from contributing money in electoral
politics, and since 1974 (with Buckley in 1976 upholding it) limits have
been upheld on wealthy individuals contributing to political parties.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
To move just a bit on this, I guess the question I want to ask is this:
has public financing ever been challenged legally? Does it face the same
legal and constitutional barriers? And, what about the mandatory
spending limits issue? And, let me throw in a third one: the National
43. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–55 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974)).
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Voters Rights Institute litigating the question of the “wealth primaries.”
The question is: does the Constitution get in the way of soft money
control? Is it a barrier to other types of financing regulation?
NICK NYHART:
I think it affects public financing around the edges. One area where
clean money reform was challenged involves the proposal to provide
matching funds if an opponent spends over the legal limit. The ACLU
made the argument that if matching funds are provided to a publicly
financed candidate when his or her opponent spends over a specified
limit, that would tamp down speech, because why would someone spend
additional money on themselves if they knew it was going to be publicly
matched for his or her opponent? But courts have decided that although
candidates may have the right to speak, they do not have the right to
unanswered speech. There are constitutional questions that arise. One
of the things that we propose concerns issue advocacy. Rather than
regulating it, we would instead match it. So instead of raising questions
about tamping down speech, it is actually publicly matched for the other
side. Speech is not limited; it is enriched by facilitating competition—
the chance to answer.
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
Let me try an angle on that and then yet another issue that you asked
about, but we didn’t get to. In public financing, as I already said,
Buckley upheld this deal in the presidential elections where you give a
candidate what is now $73 million for the general election in return for
their promise not to raise any other money for the presidential election.
So it is a spending limit and it is an absolute ban on raising money. We
now know how completely that has fallen apart. But that was upheld in
concept. So the real constitutional question there has become: can a deal
be too sweet? Voluntary limits are permissible, but can the pie be
sweetened so much that it becomes essentially not voluntary? So far, I
think correctly, the courts have answered this question in a way that
upholds these voluntary schemes.
The other important constitutional issue that is very much at stake in
the debate in Congress right now and across the United States in the
various states has to do with the question of campaign ads that do not
use certain magic words like “vote for,” “vote against,” “elect,” or
“defeat”—what I would call “sham issue ads.” They waddle, quack, and
smell like campaign ads, but the people who sponsor them, including
political parties in the soft money context, pretend they are unaware of
the election: “Oh my God, there’s an election going on out there? I
didn’t realize there was an election; I was just advertising to the public

40

PRINTERCAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM.DOC

[VOL. 40: 19, 2003]

1/15/2020 3:34 PM

Campaign Finance Reform
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

about this very important issue, the issue of what a dirt bag candidate
Jones is, right in the heat of an election.” That is a very, very difficult
set of constitutional issues that I can address later on.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Let me segue a bit, because I want to refer all of you to this: the issue
ad versus campaign ad distinction. One of the interesting things that I
learned a year and a half ago is that these are campaign ads
masquerading as issue ads. Nobody is trying to limit or ban free speech
here, we are trying to regulate campaign ads. As I make my way to
Frank, I want him to comment in the context of the pending McCainFeingold bill.
But first, back to Chuck for one preliminary question: how did the
name “soft money” arise? And do you see it as a particularly corrupting
form of money? A lot of people are confining themselves to the issue of
soft money, but we all know hard money constitutes most of the money
in the system.
CHARLES LEWIS:
The first part is difficult. I am not quite sure, but I should know that.
It is the idea that it is soft and squishy, and we will never be able to
figure out where it was spent because it moves around.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
That’ll do, even if that is not the right reason.
CHARLES LEWIS:
But there is no question that many of the abuses in the 1996
presidential campaign (easily the most controversial campaign since
Watergate in terms of scandal) were soft money related. There is no
question. But if we look at the absolute number amount, of the $3
billion spent at the federal level, soft money is really only one-sixth of
the total. So a mistake one could make is to think that this McCainFeingold legislation is a panacea that will solve all the problems of
corruption in government. It absolutely, positively will not. And that
should be made clear to everyone.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
So let me make the segue to Frank. Public Citizen and Frank have
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been major advocates of campaign reform, including what occurred this
year. This includes a real effort by various coalition partners to try to
hang together and add groups like Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids and
environmental groups, consumer groups, and business groups to create a
much broader coalition, a bipartisan coalition. And Common Cause’s
position has been that this is just one step; this is incremental. We are,
ultimately, all about supporting free television time, public financing
down the line, and other reforms. Having said that, though, the McCainFeingold bill is what we have here in Congress now. Frank, we really
ought to try to give people a quick thumbnail sketch of the McCainFeingold bill. Why is this now pending, and what is so controversial
about it?
FRANK CLEMENTE:
Thanks. Senators McCain and Feingold had a bill back in 1995 that
was a partial public financing bill—it had some free television time in
there, and it dealt with the soft money question, greater disclosure, and
issue ads. Over the years, it has morphed into a relatively incremental
approach to campaign finance reform. I actually believe that soft money
is the most central problem we are dealing with right now in the
campaign finance reform debate. It may only be one-sixth of the money,
but if you set aside all the contributions that come in $200 amounts or
less, which are quite substantial—you take that away—soft money
becomes very concentrated. It becomes very significant in terms of how
the debate is determined in Washington, D.C. It is the reason we did an
analysis, that is in your packet, called Killing Us Softly.44 What we
looked at are major industries that have important things before
Congress—the tobacco industry, the gambling industry, the oil industry,
the energy-utility companies, and insurance companies. What you have
seen since 1992, is that they were spending virtually nothing in terms of
soft money then; and now all of them are either spending forty to fifty
percent of their campaign contributions in the form of soft money. In
some industries, it is up as high as sixty to sixty-five percent. So what
was it Willie Sutton said: “Follow the money,” or something like that?
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Why do you rob banks? Because that is where the money is.
FRANK CLEMENTE:
Okay. So it tells you that if the industry has decided that is where they
want to put their dough, the indication is, obviously, that they are getting
44.
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a lot of bang for the buck. And the reason this is so important is, the
folks who are raising that soft money—Trent Lott, Mitch McConnell,
Dick Gephardt, Tom Daschle—are the people who sit at the pinnacle;
and it is the President as well, of course. They are the folks who sit at
the pinnacle and determine the legislative agenda, whether a bill gets
considered or not, and what its final content will be. So through the soft
money loophole, rather than spending through their PACs—spreading
$5000 to $10,000 contributions around to 400 members of the U.S.
House—they are able to concentrate from $100,000 up to $3 to $4
million on those leaders. Those leaders are able to determine much
more of the outcome of these battles.
There are two fundamental things being debated that are the
underpinnings of the McCain-Feingold Bill, and both are up for grabs
right now. One is this soft money ban and the ban is achieved in three
ways. It addresses the national political parties, including the Republican
National Committee and the Democratic National Committee, and their
parallel committees in the Senate and House, respectively—six national
party committees. This bill bans them from collecting and spending any
of that soft money.
Second, it also bans the state political parties from spending the money on
federal candidates. The reason that is important is because most of the
money that is being spent on issue ads and “get out the vote” and voter
registration is being spent through the state parties. A donor of a candidate
or a party leader is saying “give this $50,000 check to the state party” or
they are sending it through transfers from the national party. And these
state parties are operating according to state law, so it is whatever the state
law is out there. So if a state law says a PAC can give soft money, well,
then a PAC is free to give $100,000 in soft money.
Third, under the McCain-Feingold bill, federal office holders are
prohibited from raising this soft money, from telling somebody, “write
this check,” the way Alan Cranston did when he told Charles Keating,
the S&L swindler, to write an $850,000 check to the Democratic party.
So that is prohibited under this bill.
Now, there is one other thing to think about in the context of public
financing. Gore and Bush made a bargain with the American population.
And that was that they would run for President, and in exchange for
getting $67 million apiece in public money for the election campaign,
they were not going to take any private money to help them get elected.
Well, guess what? Their two committees combined raised $260 million,
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about 100% more than they got in public financing. And why did those
two committees take that? So they can run more on issue ads on behalf
of those two candidates than those two candidates actually spent on their
own behalf directly. So that is what we are dealing with.
And the loophole is, as Josh explained before, and I just want to
reiterate, corporations, unions, and individuals are able to funnel this
money for candidates legally, but it should be illegal.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Chuck calls it legal corruption, right? Legal bribery?
FRANK CLEMENTE:
They are able to write these large checks even though they have been
prohibited for decades from doing it and even though individuals have
been prohibited from sending to a political party more than $20,000 a
year. They are free, through this backdoor loophole, to give and to go
above limits. It is legalized bribery, a soft money laundering machine,
to be able to write these very large checks. And that is why it is such a
central part of the debate.
The other part of the McCain-Feingold Bill that is critical in dealing
with the issue ads question is that this bill will not regulate spending on
ads that expressly advocate whether somebody should be elected or
somebody should be defeated. What it is attempting to do is regulate the
ads, as Josh said, that sound like issue ads, but really are not issue ads.
The interesting thing that is going on is that ninety-six percent of the ads
the candidates themselves put on television are not saying, “vote for me”
or “vote against the other guy.” They are saying, “I’m a good guy.”
They actually sound just like issue ads. They poll better with the
population; they get a better reading from the public.
And so, what the debate is over right now concerns what is called the
“Snowe-Jeffords” amendment in the McCain-Feingold bill. And what
we have tried to do there is to carve out what is called a “bright line
test.” We think the Supreme Court will take a sympathetic view of such
a bright line test. The bill provides that in the sixty days before a general
election, when things are hot and heavy (people are putting their ads up
and the voters are most concentrated on what is going on), we are going
to prohibit a corporation and a union from spending money to put an ad
on television or on cable or on the radio that mentions any particular
candidate and says, “this guy’s a good guy,” or “this guy’s a hasty
fellow.” That is all we are trying to do with this bright line test. We
think that it would be constitutional for the reason that Josh gave before,
the Supreme Court has upheld the bans on corporations and unions
spending money to influence campaigns and giving money directly to
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the parties, giving money directly to the candidates to influence
elections.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
That is an excellent description of this issue. What is likely to be the
outcome of this debate? This tries to deal with the things that people are
concerned about: campaign costs, ads, and huge amounts of money
being collected. What do you see to be the thing that will have to be
given up? We talked quickly about the individual contribution limit
increase. What do you see to be the fundamental objection to this? The
former President of the United States, Bill Clinton, was most eloquent in
expressing his objections to the current campaign finance system. He
ran for office, pledging campaign finance reform. He was given a
chance to sign campaign finance reform and did not. The Democrats
walked in 1993 and 1994. Now, Democrats have said: “we are for this
all the way.” It might pass. But our biggest problem is with Democrats
in trying to deal with this. What are the two biggest hurdles? And give
us a five second prediction.
FRANK CLEMENTE:
It is fear. These folks want to stay elected, they want to maintain their
incumbent status, and they certainly do not want to introduce anything
into the system that could jeopardize that. And after all, they are now
sitting there in Congress, some of them have been there for twenty or
thirty or, I guess in the case of Strom Thurmond, fifty years or so, right?
And so, they do not want to give up that status. Also, this money is the
lifeblood of politics. Without money, representatives do not have the
ability to get their message out, to communicate their position, and to
ensure that they get reelected. And so, without the dough, they face the
fear of the unknown. They just do not want to meet that challenge.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Does this pass or not?
FRANK CLEMENTE:
Well, yes. A bill passes the Senate; I’ve always felt the bill passes the
Senate.
I want to say one thing about issue ads that I think is extremely
important. They have to do with not just corporations and unions,
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because this is where Mitch McConnell is just messing up, turning the
American people’s heads around. He calls this an anti-free-speech bill.
I think you can see from historic law that the corporations and unions
should not be engaged in electioneering activities. But we are agreeing
that individuals should be engaged in electioneering activities. The
issue ad provision that is now in the bill would allow nonprofit groups,
§ 501(c)(4) organizations, to run issue ads. That means the NRA, the
Christian Coalition, it means the Sierra Club. And it also allows
individuals as well. But it would allow those organizations to run issue
ads, provided they did not accept contributions from corporations and
unions to pay for those ads. And if they accepted contributions from
individuals, if you received $1000 toward a $10,000 media buy, you
would have to disclose who was funding these things.
Now remember, we are not curbing legitimate issue ads—issue ads
that say there is an important vote coming up and to call your
Congressperson and tell them to vote the right way on this. We are
talking about before an election, during a narrow period of time, about
sixty days before the general election. Using Brennan Center data, in the
last election only 250 ads out of 51,500 ads that were run during that
sixty-day period before the general election were true issue ads. In other
words, ads that advocated a position relevant to a bill that was before
Congress, concerning legislation or public policy. Everything else was
an ad that you and I would look at and would interpret as a campaign ad,
because the issue portrayed was not even before Congress.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
What is the prediction?
FRANK CLEMENTE:
My prediction is that the bill passes, it passes with the McCainFeingold soft money ban intact, it passes with the issue ad provision
intact. There will be both—amendments will be offered to substitute a
bill that is a total Swiss cheese approach to soft money, and they will try
to strip out the issue ad provision. I do not think either will be
successful.
There are a lot of other things in the bill, some of which we may not
like.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Right. Now let me make a segue here to Nick, because one of the
things that I think Nick and Public Campaign have done incredibly well
is to simplify this issue. Because one of the biggest problems in talking
about hard money, soft money, issue ads, and so forth is that people’s
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eyes glaze over. This is really very difficult. How do we get people to
get fired up to go into the streets for the McCain-Feingold bill? Where
do they get engaged? How do they become relevant? Public Campaign
has done an exceptional job at trying to figure out how you might mount
a campaign and get people involved at the state level. And it has
focused on public financing as a solution. And Nick, what I think would
be helpful would be if you would talk about how your campaigns work
and whether they have been successful.
NICK NYHART:
The starting point on the public financing systems, the full public
financing systems that we call, “clean money,” is that rather than taking
the current hodgepodge of laws and trying to fix them, we said: “let’s
start from scratch.” We start with one given limitation, and that is the
way the constitution has been interpreted. But within that rubric we
would build a campaign finance system from scratch. And I think two
values jump out in that approach. One is accountability. We want
candidates and elected officials to be accountable to the voters in their
district. And that is sort of a basic principle of representative
democracy. And the second is equity. We want different kinds of
people to be able to run for office and have an equal chance to present
their cases to the voters.
So with those two values in mind, how would you build this from
scratch? And the system that a lot of people developed over a number of
years was a clean money campaign reform. It works this way:
candidates who qualify for the system receive public financing—enough
to run a competitive campaign. But they get that support in return for
two promises. The first is that they are only going to spend the money
that they are given publicly, so they have a spending limit. And, second
and related, because they make that promise, they are in effect saying
they will take no private money. So those are the two basic conditions
to receive the funding.
Candidates qualify for the system on the basis of gathering a fixed
number of very small qualifying contributions. In our model bill, it is $5
contributions. Candidates need 1000 to run for Congress. Where the
law has actually gone into effect, in Maine for instance, it is 2500 of
these $5 contributions to run for governor. Candidates who make that
threshold get a lump sum to run their primary. If they survive the primary,
they get another sum that qualifies them for the general.
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There is another important facet of this, too. If we are running against
each other and I am a billionaire and Josh is running with public
financing, as soon as I begin to spend more than his amount, he gets
matching funds. So there is a trigger that goes into effect to yield
matching funds where a competitor spends beyond the limit. He does
not get the matching funds without any ceiling if I spend all my
billions—he doesn’t get matched forever. But he gets up to a high
enough level that, in practice, he remains competitive. A candidate does
not need the most money to win, you do not need Steve Forbes’s money
to beat Steve Forbes, but you need Bob Dole’s money to beat Steve
Forbes. So candidates receive up to a certain point.
In addition, if all of a sudden my good friend here, Scott, runs
independent expenditures against Josh, Josh receives matching funds
again, to answer back and maintain some parity in the political debate
without having to turn back to donors who can then later hold him
accountable. So that introduces some competitive equity, and it means
that people are accountable to voters and not to their donors.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
So the theory is to invest public funds in the candidates, as opposed to
private folks investing.
NICK NYHART:
That’s right.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
What is the theory here? Is it that public financing makes candidates
more responsible to the public interest or is it more designed to get more
people to run and to create more competitive elections?
NICK NYHART:
I think both are benefits. There is a handout on the tables outside
entitled, “A Waitress in the House.”45 It is the story in a Connecticut
weekly paper about a candidate from Maine who came down and
testified for the legislature there. She was a single mother and a
waitress. She never could have run for office if she had to raise money
from the lobbyists in Augusta, but she ran, and she won, and she is now
in the House. Again, people like that cannot run for office under our
current system. So its purpose is to get more and different kinds of
people to run for office.
45. Dan Levine, A Waitress in the House, VALLEY ADVOCATE, Mar. 1, 2001, at
http://old.valleyadvocate.com/valarchive.phtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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Look at Maine. The people there approved a public finance system in
1996, effective in 2000. Seventeen of the thirty-five sitting state
senators now owe nothing to any lobbyist or any other special interest
because they had to take none of that money for their campaigns. So it
is nearly a majority in the state senate.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Let me ask this: people often say that the public does not really care
about this. Senator McConnell and others say this, and in polls
campaign finance reform does not come in as a high priority. Are you
seeing any evidence that the public will support this effort more than
they support reform in other areas?
NICK NYHART:
Actually, in Maine the system is partially financed by check-offs on
their state income tax. And this check-off is getting the highest rate of
any of those offered on the form. This is ranked the highest. I think
campaign reform is broadly popular. The question has always been:
how do you motivate enough people to work on the issue or focus on the
issue to make a difference? In some of the campaigns, the initiatives not
only got a good vote, but they were able to motivate large numbers of
volunteers to work for them. In Massachusetts, for instance, I think the
largest political organization on election day, outside of the two parties,
was Massachusetts Citizens for Clean Elections.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
This is often given as the evidence to support Chuck’s position that
public finance is the way we separate our public officials from these
kind of apparently corrupt influences. Does this win every place you
go? Last year we thought this was going to be the solution; it looked
like it was winning in several states, but it has not always been
successful. Why?
NICK NYHART:
We have been on the ballot five times with a public finance system,
and we won three times. We had our first losses in the last election
when we lost in Oregon and Missouri. We have lost in routs and we
have won in routs. The interesting thing is that we took the same policy,
and when we polled it in those three states it registered about the same.
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We took the exact ballot language, and it came up about the same, too.
So the difference was not in the public popularity prior to when the
campaign began, it really had to do with the kind of coalitions people put
together, the way the message got out to people, and the strength of the
opposition.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
David, I am sure you have a stack of questions here, and I think that
we have plenty more we can cover, but let’s try to respond to the written
questions you have been collecting from the audience and the Internet.
DAVE VLADECK:
You have done a great job in provoking the audience’s interest, and I
have tried to prioritize these questions to cover some ground that
perhaps you intended to cover, but for time constraints. The first
question I would like to ask is principally addressed to Frank and Chuck.
Reform opponents often say that McCain-Feingold will weaken the
parties. Has the surge in soft money giving to the parties and party
leaders accreted power to them to determine the course of legislation,
and would a soft money ban in fact enhance the legislative process by
weakening the grip of party leaders?
FRANK CLEMENTE:
I am not sure how much I care about the parties. What I care about is
our democracy and soft money has certainly weakened our democracy.
That is where our focus ought to be and less on the structure of the
parties. Until eight years ago there really was not very much soft money
in the system, and the parties seemed to do pretty fine. All of a sudden,
these huge amounts of tens of millions of dollars have now come into
the system; and, frankly, all it means is that the parties are that much
more beholden to the interests that are providing them with that money
and that they get further and further away from the interests of the vast
majority of the population. So I am willing to take that crap shoot. I
actually think that it will make the parties better and stronger. They
have become almost like bloodsuckers, in terms of these interest groups
in Washington, D.C., and it will force them to be much more dependent
on the membership of their party. The Democratic party is worse than
the Republican party. The Republican party has many more small
donors, many more active donors in their party than do the Democrats,
and that is a fundamental problem for the Democratic party. It needs to
address it by having programs that connect better to the voter.
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DAVE VLADECK:
Chuck?
CHARLES LEWIS:
Just in a sentence, the parties are probably the most powerful lobbying
mechanisms in Washington, D.C., because no one looks at them as
lobbyists. In the 1996 election Don Fowler of the Democratic party and
Haley Barber of the Republican party were both lobbyists while they
were chairmen of the parties. And they had strategy meetings with
legislative groups. So they are getting hundreds of millions of dollars to
the parties, and they are orchestrating legislative strategy, and I
completely agree with Frank that they have become completely
untethered to the public.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Does the McCain-Feingold bill deal with that? Which way do you
think it cuts?
CHARLES LEWIS:
I think it deals with it in terms of cutting off a lot of that money. We
still have an unregulated issue with party chairmen and their personal
finances and other issues about their activities, but we will cut off their
major source from these large contributions that are extraordinary.
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
Scott, I just want to make a different point. I think the question of
party strength, when it comes to the flow of soft money, is a complete
red herring. There is a real fallacy, I think, in equating massive amounts
of money flowing into parties with party strength. I do not oppose
political parties. Strong political parties are a fundamental part of our
democracy, but we have to define what we mean by strong parties.
Traditionally, strong parties are parties in which massive amounts of
voters are mobilized at the grassroots or parties that can pass their
agenda. To say that funneling money in huge amounts into political
parties is the equivalent of party strength is like saying that eating an
enormous amount of fat saturated french fries is the measure of a strong
body.
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NICK NYHART:
We also get asked this question about the full public financing systems
we put into place. I think the best answer came from a woman who was
a multiterm incumbent in Maine who ran under this system with public
financing, and her opponent ran under the system, too. So, they were
equal on money. She said that in the old days if she had a tight race, she
simply made another round of fundraising phone calls so she could put
out more mail. That is how they communicate with voters in her district.
Now she needs to get more out of her district, more out of her
volunteers. So we see a shift there. You want to talk about a healthy
party? For her to win now, she has to activate a community organization, as
opposed to activating a network of donors. So the question is whether a
party is a group of people who are active in civic life or a bunch of
donors?
DAVE VLADECK:
Let me read the next question, and then I want to expand it a little. It
is principally directed at Josh, as follows: does the fact that not all
persons have enough money to spend in the political process violate
equal protection principles? Now what I would like you to expand on is
this: how is campaign finance reform going to help encourage people to
become challengers? We all know the power of incumbency; will the
McCain-Feingold bill make any inroad at all into the stranglehold
incumbents tend to hold on the electoral process?
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
Wow.
DAVE VLADECK:
And you have about two minutes.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Why don’t you just write the question yourself, David? I mean, don’t
pretend somebody else asked that question.
DAVE VLADECK:
I have some of those too.
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
Okay, equal protection. There are two ways to look at it. And I wasn’t
clear on what the question was asking. One is about whether all voters
are equal in a world in which some have a lot more money than others.
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DAVE VLADECK:
I think it is really the Corzine problem—only the wealthy can run, and
it is the argument that Boniface and others have made, that the electoral
process, the financing process, screens out anybody but the wealthy.
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
All right. So let’s focus on candidates. The Supreme Court quite
emphatically said in Buckley that the notion of diminishing the voice of
some in order to enhance the relative voice of others is antithetical to the
First Amendment. Now, I have always wondered what First Amendment
the Supreme Court had in mind. Think about any contest in which the
goal is to educate the audience about the decision they are about to
make. Think about the Congress, think about the Supreme Court of the
United States. You always have Robert’s Rules of Order. Those rules
don’t equalize, but they prevent one voice from so overpowering others
that it is not worth speaking at all. In the campaign finance context, I
would not talk so much about sheer political equality. Candidates will
always be unequal in all kinds of ways. Incumbents are unequal, that is,
they have an advantage in terms of name recognition. I would talk about
diminishing massive concentrated power and balance. The second half
of your question?
DAVID VLADECK:
Challengers. What is all of this discussion going to achieve if there is
really no ability for challengers to do better?
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
First, let me step away from the McCain-Feingold debate, because I
think it is a much more important question in the overall campaign
finance reform debate. I think one of the most important purposes of the
campaign finance reform is to enhance competition. It is a very difficult
thing to get people who hold public office to pass reforms that are going
to make them more likely to be challenged. But there are all kinds of
ways of fashioning rules, including public financing (which I think is the
most important), to give challengers a leg up. There are all kinds of
reforms that I think will never pass—that I would love to see on the
table, such as lifting contribution limits for challengers so that there can
be a Eugene McCarthy actually able to run a viable campaign with his
first three contributors, for example.
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FRANK CLEMENTE:
I look at the McCain-Feingold bill as sort of a tourniquet that can be
attached to some important part of a body in order to shut off the flow of
blood. It is not going to deal with the question of enhancing the ability
of challengers to run for office. I do not think that I could make that
argument. It fundamentally deals with these large contributions which
the parties are using to spend to influence the process. It is not going to
help the individual candidate. That is a hard money related problem,
which public financing attempts to deal with.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
At the town hall forums that occurred over the last six weeks, many
questions were asked of Senators McCain and Feingold, and of all of us,
by citizens. And one of the questions was: “Isn’t this going to cut off
resources, actually?” If soft money is banned, that means an independent
candidate, a third-party candidate, cannot get the money to challenge.
And one answer people need to take seriously is that most of these
interest groups are not going to give huge amounts of money to thirdparty candidates or independent candidates to challenge incumbents.
This money goes to people in power by definition. It does not go to
Republicans or Democrats; it goes to people in power in Washington,
D.C. to preserve a power base.
Turning to public finance, beyond soft money control, our biggest
challenge is finding the money candidates do need. That is why
proposals for free television time and matching resources of some kind
are so popular. You give something on the plus side for people to give
up something (unlimited spending right or high contribution limits), but
they get something in return. So I do not think it is about the
challengers. I just think that it is naive to believe that people who are
independent (unless they are independently wealthy) get a lot of soft or
hard money in order to become challengers. We know that only
fourteen out of 430 congressional seats were competitively challenged at
all last year. And in most states the numbers of truly competitive races
in the private and soft money environment are very, very low.
DAVID VLADECK:
The next question is directed to the entire panel. The civil rights bar
and the academic community are increasingly advancing the view that
the current system of financing is so heavily skewed to White
constituents as to constitute a civil rights issue. And this is really
directed to the campaign finance community. The question suggests that
the campaign finance reform community and its advocates are
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overwhelming White. What are you doing to expand the circle,
especially to Asians, Hispanics, and other minority communities?
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
I think that this is one of the greatest problems that the reform
community faces, not just in campaign finance reform. We have to find
a way to broaden our message, vision, inclusiveness, and diversity. Now
that all sounds right—the words we are using—but one of the best things
that is occurring has been coalition building among natural allies,
whether it is labor or civil rights groups, because it offers something in
return. The hardest problem I saw when I came to Washington, D.C. (I
don’t mean to sound like the rube from Massachusetts), was the absolute
belief by almost every civil rights or progressive group that they had to
have this money or they couldn’t compete. The system had become so
skewed that you had to buy into the system. And actually, the allegation
is that finally, now that we are getting power, the reform movement is
trying to take that away. That is a sad predicament. It is the same issue
we used to face in Roxbury, a poor and high minority neighborhood in
Boston, Massachusetts, as to crime in the inner city. We encountered the
view that we had to sacrifice our civil rights in order to get good police
protection. I always thought that was one of the saddest commentaries on
our system of equal justice, including my role as a prosecutor, that we
could not find a way to give people equal access and equal protection by
maybe adding more resources.
I think that is one of best things that the public financing, state based
coalitions and voluntary resources offer us. We are not going to succeed
in reforming the system until we make it far more inclusive in terms of
those trying to change the system.
NICK NYHART:
It also depends how the issue is talked about and how the laws are
shaped. An organization called the Fanny Lou Hamer Project is
composed mostly of African-American community activists from
around the country who work on campaign finance reform. And, in the
words of Dr. Gwen Patton, a veteran civil rights activist who is sort of
a mentor to many of the people involved in this, “Getting private
money out of politics is the unfinished business of the voting rights
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movement.”46 And when we look at the image of the campaign finance
movement and the image of the civil rights movement, they seem like
they are on different planets. But groups like the Fanny Lou Hamer
Project are bridging them. They have developed what they are now
calling the Fanny Lou Hamer standard for judging proposals for
campaign finance reform, and the standard is fairly simple. It says, take
a woman like Fanny Lou Hamer, who was relatively poor—in terms of
formal education, an uneducated woman from the South—but she had a
huge impact on our country through her political leadership in the early
and mid-1960s. They said a person like that ought to be able to run for
office on a level playing field, regardless of the wealth they can pull
together of their own or from other people. So let’s look at how any
proposal for campaign finance reform would treat a person like Fanny
Lou Hamer. And I think if we begin to apply those standards and
advocate for those standards, campaign finance reform can build a
bridge to natural allies, including the civil rights community.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Each person can comment if you want a minute.
CHARLES LEWIS:
I agree with the question. The reform community itself could be more
diverse, there is no question about it. Every one of the groups has
probably made some progress in diversity, and all of us could make
more. I noticed that when The Buying of the President 2000 came out
and I went on a book tour. The biggest response was from black radio
stations; it was just so interesting to me. It struck a chord, and I was
fascinated by the energy that I sensed. And it gets to the coalition issue
and the alliances. My group is an investigative reporting group, we are
not technically reformers, we do not advocate legislation. But this is the
first year I have even seen groups talk to each other. So that is progress,
and maybe someday various groups, from civil rights to the environment,
will all recognize that the fundamental issue is power and how it is
dispensed in this country.
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
I think it is important to keep two things in mind when talking about
race and civil rights. The first is that so much of the rhetoric—even at
this table—has been about recruiting them to our cause. That is the
wrong message, I think. I hear so often in civil rights groups: if you
46. Public Campaign, Clean Money Campaign Reform, at http://www.publicampaign.
org/cleanmoney.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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want us on board for campaign finance reform, take on some of our
issues and join forces with us. I think that is a very important message.
Second, we should understand another source of skepticism, that
campaign finance reform is a dressed up way of screwing minority
candidates through state contribution limits. For example, a ban on
contributions from people who are noncitizens is a nonstarter in
communities of color. We have to be very conscious of putting into our
package of reforms such elements that are nonstarters for communities
of color.
FRANK CLEMENTE:
Just two comments. First, the Congressional Black Caucus is one of
the most difficult natural constituencies to get on board with the ShaysMehan bill (the House companion bill to the Senate’s McCain-Feingold
bill). They did not want to support the legislation. Their theory was that
soft money to the parties is an important source of “get out the vote” and
voter registration money for their constituencies. Their feeling has been
that such money would dry up. Hence, it would deprive them of
resources to mobilize voters around election time.
To me, it is not just a question of diversity around race, it is the larger
constituency in general. Having worked on this for a number of years in
Washington, D.C., the real true blue folks who care about this are the
campaign reform groups, and more and more other organizations are
getting a little more involved, like tobacco control groups and other
public health groups. But it is very clear that many constituencies are
being harmed by these large contributions, by the ability of the special
interests to dictate policy, and I have always been confused by it. Partly,
the problem is with priorities. Is such reform a first order of business or
a second order of business? Other commitments are more immediate.
For me, the goal has always been not necessarily to have them engaging
in our fight, but infusing it into their battle, whether it is over tobacco
control issues or the prescription drug debate or the debate over the
Patients’ Bill of Rights. The role of special interests in determining the
outcome of those issues is critical, but it is difficult to convince
advocacy groups to prioritize changing the long range rules of the game
applicable to all of them when they have in front of them immediate
substantive issues affecting their constituency.
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SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Okay, we are going to try to be brief, including even me. But I want
to offer one example. The Greenlining Institute in San Francisco is a
wonderful example of what I hope we are trying to do. They are trying
to make campaign funding a civil rights issue because they believe it is a
barrier to equal justice. John Gamboa is very eloquent on the point. He
has seen dramatic changes demographically in elected officials. He has
not seen dramatic changes in the resulting public policy. Therefore,
something more is going on here, and he reflects the view that Chuck
has, that I think we all need to have, about fundamental reform of the
system. And that is why we need everybody involved.
DAVID VLADECK:
Let’s move back to the McCain-Feingold bill. There were a number of
questions which I am going to combine and direct to Frank. First, is there a
killer amendment that you can envision being added to the McCainFeingold bill that would cause you to withdraw your support, and, to the
extent that the carrot of a soft money ban is being tied to a stick of raising
campaign finance limits to $2000 or $3000, do you think that would be a
fair trade off given your concerns about hard money?
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
The individual limit, right?
DAVID VLADECK:
The individual limit.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
So why don’t you take one shot, I’ll add to that, and then we will go
from there.
FRANK CLEMENTE:
I want to know who asked that very tough question. My boss is out
here in the audience; Joan, what should I say?
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Did Joan Claybrook ask this question? Let’s get this clear right now.
FRANK CLEMENTE:
This is the $64 million question.
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SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
She would have asked it of me, first, though, Frank. Don’t worry.
FRANK CLEMENTE:
The reason I answered my telephone before was because I thought it
was somebody calling about this, because right now the Democrats are
scrambling to figure out how to deal with this hard money question.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
One minute. What is the answer here? What is the answer?
FRANK CLEMENTE:
I cannot speak for the reform community. For Public Citizen, the fight
is over whether or not to increase the hard money limit, the amount that an
individual can contribute to a candidate. It is now $1000 for an election,
and if we add the primary and the general, that is $2000 in the cycle. The
typical proposal has been to increase that amount of money to $3000 so an
individual will be able to give $6000 in a cycle, not $2000. And if it is a
husband and wife, maybe they could give $12,000. That is a killer
amendment from Public Citizen’s point of view in terms of withdrawing
support for the bill. The question was, what would I agree to?
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Nick, I know you want—
NICK NYHART:
I think the opposition wants to split the reform community, which is
arrayed along a spectrum. There are people from the business
community who are in support of the soft money ban and who think
increasing contribution limits is a healthy thing to do for the system.
And then there are people—where’s Wendy? Would a $1001 limit
cause PIRG to get off?47 Yes? Okay. And we are probably pretty close
to where the PIRGs are on that, and it is just a question of strategy. The
Hagle bill would say it is legal to have soft money, and so there is a
47. Referring to the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (USPIRG), directed by
Wendy Wendlandt, an umbrella association of state public interest research groups
founded by college students in numerous states.

59

PRINTERCAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM.DOC

1/15/2020 3:34 PM

group of people who want to be against that. We think the current limits
are probably too high anyway, so actually increasing them is anathema
for us and others within the reform community.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
This has been one of the great lessons of my time: nothing changes in
reform coalitions regardless of the topic. And having gone through the
tobacco settlement and those negotiations with Matt Meyers, the gun
control issues, and their various groups, I felt right at home when I came
to the campaign finance reform. Although people could agree on ninetyeight percent of things, a couple of things could divide us, and if we
were really good, we could just blow ourselves up without Mitch
McConnell having to do anything! If this bill passes this time, it will be
because the reform community has made a valiant effort to try to stay
together and work as hard as they can to try to find common ground.
And I think it is making a huge difference in terms of how people are
assessing this, that they expected to be able to divide this community
much more easily. We are all committed, whether we agree or not, to
staying in conversation with each other about these topics. Common
Cause’s position has been that we oppose the individual increases. At
the end of the day though, we want to look at the total package. Banning
soft money and the sham issue ads is very, very important. Most believe
that two-thirds of the senators would raise this limit in a heartbeat to
$3000 if given a choice. They view that as being nothing more than
$1000 or less in 1974 terms, given inflation since the limit was enacted.
You all have been in coalitions, you all have been in these kinds of
fights. I think this time there has been a real effort to stay together, and I
am glad we are a part of it. And we have a lot of other things to take on,
whether or not it happens with the McCain-Feingold Bill. And we have
a lot more elements of reform, and I appreciate that. But it is going to be
very tough. This is going to be a tough one, but we will see.
FRANK CLEMENTE:
If I could just add, you folks [addressing the California audience] are
probably in the most strategic position of any state in the country to affect this
outcome. Your senator, Diane Feinstein, is the Democrat trying to promote
the limit increase to $3000. So 150 phone calls into her office Monday
morning would make a substantial difference in the outcome of that debate.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
Or, go to AmericansforReform.org and register your views right now.
Senators are thinking about this issue—it is on their minds for a change,
and I think it is very important to get into it.
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FRANK CLEMENTE:
The switchboard number is (202) 224-3121. Ask for Senator Feinstein’s
office. I am telling you, she is the person who is trying to cut the deal on
this increase to $3000.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
David, keep going here.
DAVID VLADECK:
Well, for anyone who does not remember, just ask Joan; she knows
these phone numbers by heart. One concern, and I think that Josh is
probably the best to answer this, is that the approaches to campaign
finance reform have perhaps harmful implications. For example, legal
services programs? That is, is there a correlation here where, if money
is not speech in politics, what about for the Legal Services Corporation?
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
You’re right, I guess I am the right person to ask because we are
litigating both campaign finance cases and just won the case in the
Supreme Court about efforts to limit legal services by lawyers who
accept federal funds. There is a connection. First, I would qualify the question.
Again, this is not about whether money is speech; it is about efforts to
limit political influence—bought and paid for by money. I see two connections.
One is that in general, the ability to give money to organizations, or the
ability of organizations to spend money, may be protected speech. It is
only in the electoral context that the Supreme Court has carved out this
exception and said that elections involve such compelling state interests
that a special set of rules can apply. Government may restrict the flow
of money into or out of related entities. So elections are already
cordoned off by the Supreme Court. And I do not fear that there is a big
danger that tinkering with those rules in the electoral context will affect
the ability of other nonprofits to speak about all kinds of issues.
The second connection is complicated, but I can state it very simply.
It has to do with the public financing issue. If, for example, government
cannot buy up rights by giving money to legal services attorneys in
return for a promise that they do not litigate certain kinds of cases or
take up certain kinds of positions, why then is it permissible for the
government to give a big chunk of money to candidates in return for
their promise not to spend as they are entitled to under the First
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Amendment beyond a certain limit. And that is a really tough set of
positions to reconcile. I believe I can, but I would need more time.48
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
There are many more questions. We want to do a quick five-minute
wrap here with each person getting a chance to do a minute. I want to
do a minute at the end.
I do want to say on that issue, though, I hope people take it very
seriously. Mr. Nader reminded us at lunchtime about the obligation of
the members of the bar to work for equal justice. We are pleased that
the Legal Services Corporation is now actually able to do again what it
was created to do because the rest of the bar was not. With that, Frank,
then I am going to go to Josh, Nick, and Chuck for a one-minute wrap
here.
FRANK CLEMENTE:
Just a couple of things to look for next week, because we have a good
civics lesson taking place in Washington, D.C. on the McCain-Feingold
bill. There will be a big fight over what is called the Severability
amendment; that is, an amendment to change what is in the bill right
now. Right now the McCain-Feingold bill is drafted like most bills are
drafted—if one of the provisions of the bill were to be struck down,
everything else would still stand and still be applicable. The Republicans
are trying to change this part of the bill so that if any piece of the
legislation is declared unconstitutional, the entire bill falls. It is an
important debate, and the removal of this standard severability clause
tied into why they are trying to attach some nasty and obviously
unconstitutional amendments to it. That is a backdoor, poison pill way
to kill legislation.
E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ:
Because I am the one designated as the constitutional person, I’ll wrap
up with a note on the Constitution. Whenever I talk about free speech
and the Constitution or efforts to control the flow of money in politics, I
always feel that I have to go back to first principles. Really, to the first
words of the Constitution, which are: “We, the People.” We, the people,
48. The limitations enacted by Congress to prohibit attorneys for the poor from
challenging the constitutionality of Congressional enactments, bringing a class action
remedy, and so forth, may raise issues of due process for litigants, the integrity of the
judicial branch, which depends upon the advocacy before it to fulfill its constitutional
function to check the legislative and executive branches, and the fiduciary duty of an
attorney to a client. These and other issues may distinguish the legal services limitations
as involving impermissible restraints separate and apart from the First Amendment.
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are the ones who ratified the Constitution as a charter of our own
government. It was we the people—not the business corporations,
unions, and other nonindividuals—who now have the ability to spend
enormous amounts of money to buy access and influence. And I think it
is important to bear that context in mind when we talk about what it is
that this same Constitution governs as we try to wrestle back into the
control to the people of the single most important element of our selfgovernment—our elections.
NICK NYHART:
I have been designated to talk about what we can win that is bigger
than what is on the plate now, so let me just say that there has never
been a better time to work on campaign finance reform. We have seen a
steady increase in what it costs to run for office, which disenfranchises
people from the political system. The present political situation with the
Republican trifecta in Washington, D.C. is going to mean that the policy
benefits, the policy payoffs for donors, are going to be more clear. We
have already seen what has being whipped through in the first forty or so
days of the Bush Administration; it is the contributors’ agenda. We need
to make a stink about that. As the economy tightens, people are going to
be angry, there are going to be more losers than there are winners in the
economy over the next two years, and people are going to be ready to be
properly agitated, as Jim Hightower49 was saying earlier. To take
advantage of that, we need to build much broader reform coalitions. We
need to treat this as an issue not about process, but about power.
And finally, reformers need to take up the electoral tools that so many
other movements or interest groups have used in the past.
CHARLES LEWIS:
In terms of the drama unfolding, the one thing we have not talked
about is President George W. Bush, the so-called reformer with results,
who never reformed anything relevant to this subject. The last person in
the U.S. to veto campaign finance legislation was his father, in 1992. The
last person to sign campaign finance legislation was an unelected
Republican, Gerald Ford.

49. Former Agriculture Commissioner of the State of Texas, current radio
journalist, and consumer advocate.
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SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
What is the lesson there?
CHARLES LEWIS:
The lesson is that George W. Bush has a very interesting predicament.
He does not want to look like a hack. And if something emerges out of
the Congress, he has a dilemma about which way to go, but I am not
holding my breath.
One hundred million Americans do not vote in this country. One out
of four Americans have trust in government; back in the 1960s, it was
three out of four. We have the lowest trust anyone has ever seen in this
country. And to me this is the preeminent issue of our time. We must
ask if we still have a legitimate government that we care about, trust, and
believe in? And if all of this goes and it is so much wind and nothing
happens, when most Americans see their politicians as corrupt and the
political and incumbent class does nothing, we are at a very, very
interesting impasse and a profound moment in our political history.
SCOTT HARSHBARGER:
You have probably all heard Bill Moyers speak very eloquently on
this topic, and one of the things that he (and Derek Bok) points out is
that the great danger in our democracy is not external threats, but the
erosion from within by the lack of participation by people in it. And
Moyers uses the example that a democracy is in great peril when
somebody’s civic worth is measured by their net worth. It is his belief
that that is where we are now and that is why the reforms are so
important.
The second point is why for me, and I think for everybody here, this is
about a much broader issue. Campaign finance reform is, I think, an
example of the problem, not the problem. I think this is about
reclaiming democracy. I think it is about who owns the government, and
I think to do that you have to re-engage people in our democracy,
including young people and others who have been totally alienated and
feel that it does not matter at all if they participate. And that is a radical
change; it is a very dangerous situation. But the flip of that is that it
means we have to do something positive, that we cannot just be against
things, and that is why we have to figure out how you re-engage people;
how do we re-engage? How do we, in a democracy, claim that public
policy is set by those we elect, and yet, if we don’t participate in the
elective process, we should not be surprised what comes out of that. So
we have to create, once again, a very broad citizen movement, and that is
what this is all about for me.
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I want to thank our panelists for a tremendous presentation, but also
please look at the materials. Understand that everybody here would be
very glad to speak to your group, to reach out to you, to give you more
information. Everybody who had questions and did not have them
answered, if they can be posted or given to us, we will make every effort
that we can to respond, and other people who want to post later on
comments, suggestions to any of us individually or collectively, we
would be very glad to receive them; and, again, we thank you very much
for giving us this chance.
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